

Pacific Air Forces

*I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n
c e*

OPSEC Refresher Briefing



U.S. AIR FORCE



Antiterrorism and Force Protection

**With all the importance attached to
the Antiterrorism and Force
Protection Awareness(AT/FP)
Campaign, we need to keep in mind
some basic fundamentals.**

**This briefing will discuss the Operations
Security (OPSEC) area of AT/FP.**



To Be Discussed

- **Areas of OPSEC**
 - **Critical Information**
 - **Threat Analysis**
 - **Vulnerabilities**
 - **Risk Assessment**
 - **Countermeasures**
- **What can you do**
- **Critical Information List**



Critical Information

- **Critical Information: Requires protection.**
Information that when collected or observed by an adversary, could reveal "TARGET" information.
- **Examples**
 - Alert Status
 - Asset Location
 - Aircraft Status
 - Time Lines
 - Communications Capabilities
 - Personnel Status
 - Fuel Status



Threat Analysis

- **Know the threat; identify your adversaries**
- **Determine adversary's ability to collect, process, analyze and utilize our information**
- **Collection Methods**
 - **COMINT -- Communications (fax, cells)**
 - **HUMINT -- Human (observers, liaisons)**
 - **IMINT -- Imagery (photos, camcorders)**
 - **OSINT -- Open source (news articles).**



Vulnerabilities

- OPSEC vulnerabilities exist when "three conditions coincide":
 - Detectable actions and indicators are accessible to the adversary
 - Adversary must be able to process, evaluate, and interpret the indicators
 - Adversary must be able to react to the interpretation in sufficient time and manner



Risk Assessment

- Determine whether possible loss of information through exploitation justifies implementing countermeasures
- If countermeasures required:
 - What type?
 - How long?



Countermeasures

- **Actions taken to counter or eliminate vulnerabilities that point to or divulge critical information**
- **Examples:**
 - **Changing procedures**
 - **Controlling Critical Information**
 - **Refining security procedures**



What can you do?

- **Use STU - III or Red Switch Phones**
 - Never “talk around” info
- **Be aware of Critical Information**
- **Protect Personal Info (SSNs, etc)**
 - Identity theft is a major problem today
- **Practice Good Compusec**
 - Protect passwords, use correct format
 - NEVER LEAVE EMAIL OPEN!!!
- **Check badges/ID if you don't know the person**
- **NOT SURE Call Your Security Manager!**

Capt Edwards or Lt Wunder 725-5487

Integrity - Service - Excellence



607WS Critical Information

- 1. (U) Combat Capability
 - a. Combat readiness of headquarters and subordinate units
 - b. Manning and support problems at each echelon
 - c. **Planned deployments, exercises and commitments of resources. Note: Often exercise dates &/or locations are classified. Check with your supported unit for guidance.**
 - d. WRM status which indicates a deficiency/limitation or overall capability to support contingency plans or reveals overall system support capability
 - e. Information identifying contingency plan limitations/shortfalls or unit published limitation factors (LIMFACs)



607WS Critical Information

- 1. (U) Combat Capability Continued
 - f. Information revealing specific contingency support requirements/capabilities
 - g. The effectiveness and speed of recall procedures at each echelon
 - h. Information revealing current Rules of Engagement (ROE)
 - i. Emergency war preparation requirements. Note: Information may be classified. If in doubt, assume it is classified.



607WS Critical Information

- 2. (U) Logistics/Maintenance Support. Personnel/equipment shortages, outages, or capabilities that may affect mission capability. Note: **Information may be classified. If in doubt, assume it is classified.**
- 3. (U) DV and VIP Travel. Travel by, pending locations, and itinerary of MAJCOM/MACOM/USFK commanders, vice commanders, or any US civilian or military member in the grade of O-6 or higher unless released as public information by the headquarters involved. Note: Information may be classified on a case-by-case basis. If in doubt, check with the protocol office or visit OPR.



607WS Critical Information

- 4. (U) Base Status/Security
 - a. **Strengths/weakness of installations/sites at which 607 WS personnel are deployed**
 - b. **Strengths/weakness of 607 WS facilities (garrison or deployed)**
 - c. **Security clearances, deficiencies, violations, or exploitable personnel weaknesses**



607WS Critical Information

- 5. (U) Intelligence
 - a. Relationships between intelligence sources and gathered intelligence, as well as intelligence gathering assets (communications architecture).
 - b. Mission impacts of our Cloud-Free Line-of-Sight (CFLOS or Recce), forecasts, reconnaissance sensors and their relationship to our forecasts (sensitivities)
 - c. Information related to enemy unit identifications, locations, strengths, and capabilities
 - d. Friendly command post or headquarters locations.
 - e. Information regarding status of enemy defenses and deployment



Critical Information

- 6. (U) Communications-Electronics
 - a. Information revealing COMSEC deficiencies
 - b. **Association of KQ identifiers with actual Combat Weather Teams and their locations**
 - c. HF/FM communications architecture, frequencies, and call signs.
 - d. **User IDs & passwords for controlled access websites, homepages, LANs, file servers, etc.**



607WS Critical Information

- 7. (U) Plans
 - a. **Wartime deployment locations/missions for 607 WS personnel. The name/location of the CPs are CLASSIFIED**
 - b. **Wartime unit composition/equipment/readiness**
 - c. **Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) for incoming Combat Weather Teams**
 - d. **Correlation of any OPLAN number with actual war or contingency plans**
 - e. **Any war or contingency plans of those units supported by 607 WS**



Critical Information

- 7. (U) Plans Continued
 - f. Exercise dates more than 30 days from STARTEX
Note: major theater dates are classified until released by CINC/CFC, including the MONTH of the exercise.
 - g. Exercise scripted dates (and scripted weather dates) which do not correspond to the actual calendar dates of the exercise
 - h. Referring to the Japanese geostationary satellite pictures as GMS (7AF CI)